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aBstract
It is important to determine whether a foetus had been born alive since 
various legal consequences follow upon such a determination. This article is 
concerned with the determination of live birth in terms of section 239 of the 
Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 and live non-birth, the latter concept as 
transpired in the case of S v Mshumpa 2008 (1) SACR 126 (E). The medico-
legal importance and risks of the hydrostatic test in determining live birth 
will be considered and its novel application in determining breathing before 
birth (live non-birth) for the purpose of criminal proceedings will also be 
discussed. Reference will be made to case law and legislation from the 
United Kingdom and selected states from the United States of America in 
order to show that section 239 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, 
which requires only that it be proved that a foetus had breathed in order 
to establish live birth, does not take into consideration the present medical 
opinion on the matter, or the legal developments with regard to infanticide 
and the determination of live birth in other jurisdictions.
1. Introduction
Whether or not a foetus had been born alive remains a controversial and 
contentious problem in forensic medicine.1From a legal perspective, 
it is also very important to know whether a foetus was indeed born 
alive as legal subjectivity is only afforded to a foetus upon live birth. 
Many other legal consequences may also follow upon a determination 
of live birth. For example, the primary objective of the provisions of 
the Inquests Act 58 of 1959 is that investigations into the circumstances 
of death be held where a reasonable belief exists that a person has 
died from unnatural causes. Whether this reference to persons also 
includes a still born baby was considered in Van Heerden v Joubert NO 
& others.2 Grosskopf JA for the Supreme Court of Appeal found that 
the term person, in the context of the Inquests Act, should be given 
* BA, LLB, LLD (Stell), Part time Lecturer, Stellenbosch University.
** BA, LLB (Stell).
1 JJ Moar ‘The hydrostatic test – A valid method of determining live birth?’ (1997) 
18(1) The American Journal of Forensic Medicine and Pathology 109-110. 
2 1994 (4) SA 793 (A).
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its ordinary and literal meaning and does not include an unborn (or 
stillborn) child.3
Another example where the law requires a determination on 
whether a foetus was born alive is in terms of sections 4 and 9(1) of 
the Registration of Births and Deaths Act 51 of 1992. In terms of these 
provisions all children born alive must be registered within 30 days after 
the birth. And, section 18 of the Act requires that a medical practitioner 
who was present at a still-birth, issue a prescribed certificate to that 
effect. If a medical practitioner was not present, a person present to 
such a still-birth must make the necessary declaration thereto. Non-
compliance to this provision constitutes a criminal offence in terms of 
section 31(1) of the Act.4
The primary focus of this article will not be on the commencement 
of legal subjectivity. The discussion will also not include references 
to the pro-choice/right-to-life debate or wrongful life case law and 
arguments. The primary focus of this article is rather to evaluate 
the medico-legal considerations involved in the application of the 
hydrostatic test in determining live birth and breathing before birth 
for the purpose of criminal proceedings. In other words, the focus 
will be on the manner of determining live birth in legal theory. 
First, the legislative background to determining live birth will be 
discussed, where after the hydrostatic test as a forensic tool to 
determine live birth will be explained from a legal perspective. The 
remainder of the discussion will focus on the application of this test 
in the South African case of S v Mshumpa 2008 (1) SACR 126 (E).
Legal developments with regard to the application of the hydrostatic 
test in the United Kingdom and various states in the USA will also be 
considered. The article will conclude with a review of foreign case 
law on the determination of live birth, feticide5 legislation and the 
application of the hydrostatic test.
2. Determining live birth
In terms of South African jurisprudence legal subjectivity is only 
afforded to a person upon live birth and, a foetus is only deemed 
to have been born alive if the birth was completed and there was 
complete separation between the mother and the child. The child must 
also have lived after the birth process. There is no prescribed period 
for which the new born must have lived in order to be classified as alive 
3 Van Heerden v Joubert NO & others supra (n2) at 798G/H-H; Also see Roe v. Wade, 
410 U.S. 113, 142 (1973).
4 Also see section 113 of the General Law Amendment Act 46 of 1935.
5 Feticide refers to the act that causes the death of a foetus; RA Jordaan and CJ Davel 
Law of Persons 4ed (2005) 12.
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and to be afforded legal subjectivity and, there is also no prescribed 
method of determining whether the child had in fact lived. Moreover, 
the requirement that the birth must have been completed does not 
require that the umbilical cord be severed before it would be deemed 
that the child was born alive and legal subjectivity is afforded.6 
This viewpoint on the commencement of legal subjectivity and the 
requirements for live birth date back to 530 AD and are supported in 
Roman and Roman-Dutch texts.7
Section 239(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 deals with 
infanticide or concealment of birth and provides for some indication 
of what this two pronged approach to the determination of a live birth 
and the commencement of legal subjectivity entail:
‘239. Evidence on charge of infanticide or concealment of birth.—
(1)  At criminal proceedings at which an accused is charged with the killing 
of a newly-born child, such child shall be deemed to have been born 
alive if the child is proved to have breathed, whether or not the child 
had an independent circulation, and it shall not be necessary to prove 
that such child was, at the time of its death, entirely separated from the 
body of its mother.
(2)  At criminal proceedings at which an accused is charged with the 
concealment of the birth of a child, it shall not be necessary to prove 
whether the child died before or at or after birth.’
Based on this provision, the appropriate manner in which to determine 
whether a foetus was born alive is to determine whether the foetus 
had breathed.8
From a medical perspective, however, the first breath drawn by the 
foetus is not necessarily a conclusive sign of life. Cunningham, for 
example, defines live birth (from a medical perspective) as:
‘The term used to record a birth whenever the new-born, at or sometime 
after birth, breathes spontaneously or shows any other sign of life such as a 
heartbeat or definite spontaneous movement of voluntary muscles. Heartbeats 
are distinguished from transient cardiac contractions, and respirations are 
differentiated from fleeting respiratory efforts or gasps.’9
And Knuppel submits that:
‘The central and motor pathways of the foetal respiratory system are active, 
and respiration at birth is the culmination of in utero processes. Two main 
types of foetal breathing movements are recognized…In general, these 
movements are governed by the same central nervous system patterns that 
6 DSP Cronjé and J Heaton Die Suid-Afrikaanse Personereg 2ed (2003) 7.
7 D 25.4.1.1, 35.2.9.1; C 6.29.3; Voet 1.5.5. also D 50.16.129.
8 It is important to note, for the discussion in section 5 of this article, that independent 
circulation is not required for live birth. 
9 FG Cunningham et al. Chapter 1: Overview of Obstetrics in Williams Obstetrics 23rd 
ed (2010).
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control changes in foetal heart rate and body movements…The first breath of 
the new born normally occurs within the first 10 seconds after delivery. The 
first breath usually is a gasp, the result of central nervous system reaction to 
sudden pressure, temperature change, and other external stimuli. With the 
first breath, the slight increase in PO2 may activate chemoreceptors to send 
impulses to the central nervous system respiratory centre and then to the 
respiratory musculature.’10
It is clear from these two quotations that breathing as a requirement 
of live birth is not always easy to establish and must furthermore 
be distinguished from gasps or breathing efforts made by the foetus, 
since such gasps may not always be a clear and unequivocal sign of life 
but may rather be a reaction of the central nervous system to changing 
circumstances or surroundings. This distinction is often, from a legal 
point of view, overlooked but is of great importance as was evident in 
case of S v Mshumpa11discussed below.
3. The hydrostatic test
In the seventeenth century Wilhelm Gottfried Ploucquet devised a new 
method for determining whether a new-born had breathed based on 
the observation that breathing increases blood flow to the lungs, and 
that the ratio of body weight to the weight of the lung would therefore 
be significantly higher where the new-born had breathed compared 
to where the new-born had not breathed.12 Breathing furthermore 
allows for the dispersion of air into the surfactant-rich liquid of mature 
lungs and assists with the formation of stable alveoli. Such pulmonary 
respiration will change the nature of the tissue from being red, heavy 
and dense to being white, light and less dense. In both Cronjé and 
Heaton13 as well as in Jordaan and Davel14 this hydrostatic test 
devised by Ploucquet, is described as the appropriate medico-legal 
test to determine live birth. The test is described as follows: The lungs 
of a recently born foetus are cut into pieces and then placed in water. 
If the lung tissue floats, it is accepted that the foetus had inhaled air 
and that it was absorbed into the lungs just before death. The lungs 
of a still-born child (a child that has not breathed) will, however, sink 
in water.15The number of factors which could potentially influence 
10 RA Knuppel Chapter 8: Maternal-Placental-Fetal Unit; Fetal & Early Neonatal 
Physiology in AH DeCherney et al Current Diagnosis & Treatment Obstetrics & 
Gynecology 10th ed (2007).
11 2008 (1) SACR 126 (E).
12 MN Wessling Infanticide trials and forensic medicine: Württemburgs 1757-1793 in M 
Clark & C Crawford (eds) Legal Medicine in History (1994) 117-144. 
13 Cronjé and Heaton op cit (n6) 7.
14 Jordaan and Davel op cit (n5) 12; Also see Moar op cit (n1) 109
15 Moar op cit (n1) 109.
274 SACJ . (2012) 2
SACJ-2012-2-Text.indd   274 10/26/12   3:16:56 PM
whether lung tissue will float in water is nevertheless legio, and this 
test for live birth is consequently also criticised.16
Moar emphasised the risk of misdiagnosing live birth when using 
this test: ‘…[T]he majority of new born infants seen at autopsy show 
signs of varying degrees of decomposition, as they are often found in 
garbage, wrapped in newspaper or plastic bags, or lying in an open 
field. Even microscopic putrefaction can cause unexpanded lungs 
to float, when gas formation may not be macroscopically apparent. 
Naturally, any attempts at resuscitation may partially expand the lungs 
of a new born infant, leading to further difficulty in establishing 
live birth.’17In other words, gases released during the process of 
decomposition (putrefaction) and that built up in tissue like the lungs 
may also cause lung tissue to float in water when the hydrostatic test 
is performed. Mouth-to-mouth resuscitation, external cardiac massage, 
and the administration of oxygen are other factors which can also lead 
to an erroneous conclusion regarding live birth.
Special care should therefore be taken to ensure that gases released 
during decomposition (or air and other gases that may have been 
absorbed by the lungs other than by natural breathing) are expelled 
from the lungs. To expel such air and gasses from the lungs and to 
counter the effects of any of these risk factors mentioned above, the 
application of the controversial compression test is suggested.18 The 
compression test requires that the lung tissue is placed between two 
wooden blocks and then compressed. This will expel gases caused 
by decomposition from the lung tissue, but will not expel inspired 
air. Since oxygen that was inhaled naturally cannot be expelled from 
lung tissue in this manner there is no risk that this test will adversely 
influence the outcome of the hydrostatic test. This method is, however, 
discarded by Knight who submits that the visual appearance of the 
tissue as well as the feel of the tissue is rather important. Fully respired 
lungs will be pink or mottled in appearance and spongy in texture 
while the lungs of a stillborn will be dark, small, heavy, dense, solid 
and liver-like.19 Unaerated lungs (lungs not supplied or filled with 
air) will have very little blood and will also not crackle when cut or 
pressed with the fingers as there will be no bubbles of air captured in 
the tissue.20
16 Moar op cit (n1) 109; B Knight Infanticide and stillbirth in Knight, B (ed) Forensic 
Pathology (1990) 402 – 413 and B Knight & PJ Saukko Knight’s forensic pathology 
3rd ed (2004) 445-447. 
17 Moar op cit (n1) 109. Also see Morgan v State 148 Tenn. 417, 256 S.W. 433 (1923). 
18 Knight op cit (n16) 402-413. 
19 Ibid.
20 WF Rhodes, I Gordon & R Turner Medical Jurisprudence 2ed (1945) 183; Also see 
Knight & Saukko op cit (n16) 445-447. 
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Further valuable corroboration of the respiratory act can also be 
found in the presence of air in the stomach and intestines, as an 
infant’s first breath is often coupled with the swallowing of air.21Some 
pathologists also make use of other corroborative tests including the 
bladder test which rests on the assumption that a discharge of urine 
cannot take place without the action of the lungs. Another test devised 
by Plouquet and also used by some pathologists is known as the 
hemorrhal test. In this test the relative weight of the lungs to the whole 
body is determined and the alteration produced in that relation by the 
act of breathing is set as 1 to 55 where the lungs have inhaled and 1 to 
70 where the lungs have not been aerated. Daniel’s test, on the other 
hand, takes into consideration the absolute gravity of the lungs and 
the other changes produced by respiration, the inflation of the lungs 
and the expansion of the chest.22
Today the hydrostatic test is generally accepted as the standard test to 
determine whether the foetus had breathed. Yet, as was seen from the 
discussion above, this test for the determination of live birth is fraught 
with difficulty. Moar therefore correctly submits that the hydrostatic 
test should not be applied in isolation when determining whether 
breathing has occurred. While most reliance is usually placed on the 
hydrostatic test, supporting tests23 and the careful consideration of 
the circumstances surrounding the death of/stillborn, should be kept 
in mind during the post-mortem examination.24
4.  Application of the hydrostatic test in S v Mshumpa 2008 
(1) SACR 126 (E)
In S v Mshumpa Melissa Shelver was in the 38th week of gestation. On 
the morning of the incident Shelver and Best (her partner and father 
of the child) visited the gynaecologist who informed them that there 
were no complications and that an uneventful birth was anticipated. 
The couple was hijacked, however, by Ludwe Mshumpa outside the 
consulting room. Mshumpa gave Best instruction to drive to a remote 
destination where both Best and Mshumpa got out of the vehicle. 
Mshumpa shot Best in the shoulder and Shelver twice in the abdomen. 
21 H Littlejohn ‘Proof of life birth in criminal cases’ (1922) 1:3187 The British Medical 
Journal 142-145. See AS Taylor and JJ Reese A manual of medical jurisprudence 
(1873) for a comprehensive discussion of the physical signs/tests for complete 
birth. 
22 F Wharton A treatise on the criminal law of the United States: Presedents of 
indictments and please, state trials of the United States etc. (1855) 334. 
23 Supporting tests can include the liver floatation test for decomposition, the 
macroscopic appearance of the lungs, and the compression test which was discussed 
in the preceding paragraph.
24 Moar op cit (n1) 109.
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Although both Best and Shelver survived, the foetus could not be 
saved. It later transpired that Best was behind the staged hijacking 
and shooting and that he had devised the plan in order to get rid of 
the unborn child.
Both Best and Mshumpa were charged, inter alia, with the 
murder of the unborn child as the prosecution argued that South 
African jurisprudence has reached a state of development where the 
intentional killing of an unborn child in the womb of the mother 
constitutes murder.25An expert medical witness furthermore testified 
that foetal viability26 in the 38th week of gestation was, at least on 
these set of facts, a certainty.27 Moreover, when Best and Mshumpa 
was asked what crime they thought they had committed with regards 
to the foetus, both responded that their conduct was tantamount to 
murder.28Of greater importance is the evidence which was produced 
on behalf of the state by Dr Kirsten, a neo-natal medical expert.
According to Kirsten, the unborn child was indeed viable in the 
sense that it was almost absolutely certain that, had she been delivered 
by Caesarean section on the day of the incident, she would have 
been born alive and healthy. Medical science, it was submitted, now 
considers a foetus to be viable by the 25th week of gestation. And, 
it is generally required that a death notification form be completed 
for a foetus stillborn at 26 weeks. Kirsten also explained that the 
foetus would have experienced pain in the same manner as a normal 
living baby and, the foetus’s reaction to the pain inflicted upon her 
by the two bullet wounds that entered her body caused a reaction 
that would normally manifest itself only upon normal birth and after 
being expelled from the womb. It was held that when a living person 
is shot and experiences great blood loss, one of the compensatory 
mechanisms of the body is to accelerate breathing in an effort to 
obtain more oxygen. Curiously, the same happened to the foetus 
in Shelver’s womb. In reaction to the pain caused by the bullets the 
unborn foetus experienced an impulse for accelerated breathing. The 
forensic evidence submitted in support of this argument showed that 
the lungs of the unborn foetus was filled with amniotic fluid and red 
blood cells, indicative of the distress she had experienced by the pain 
of the bullet wounds and that this had triggered a breathing impulse 
25 S v Mshumpa 2008 (1) SACR 126 (E), para [10]. 
26 The viability of a foetus, according to Lupton, refers to that stage of development 
at which a foetus can survive outside the womb on its own or with artificial life 
support. See ML Lupton ‘The Legal Status of the Embryo’ (1988) Acta Juridica 197-
215, 205. 
27 S v Mshumpa 2008 (1) SACR 126 (E), para [48]; Lupton op cit (n26) 205; For a 
definition of the term preterm neonate, see Cunningham op cit (n 9). 
28 S v Mshumpa 2008 (1) SACR 126 (E), para [49]. 
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and had caused her to inhale amniotic fluid as well as some of her 
own blood. Kirsten argued that the unborn foetus can therefore be 
said to have been alive in her mother’s womb and had died there as a 
result of the gunshot wounds to her body. It was also submitted, from 
a medical point of view, that the unborn foetus’s life and death inside 
the womb did not differ in its very nature from the life and death of a 
normal person living outside the womb. The only difference was the 
location where this foetus’s life and death had occurred.29
The reasoning in Kirsten’s testimony is supported by many other 
medical scholars including Knuppel who said that a foetus probably 
suffers pain just as any other person and a near-term foetus has nearly 
all the neurological attributes of a newly born infant.30 Yet, can the 
reasoning of the hydrostatic text be applied to this scenario? Since no 
oxygen entered the lungs, there would have been no macroscopically 
detectable change in the appearance of the lung tissue and, it would 
have remained “liver-like” as described by Knight.31 Also, the lungs 
would have sunk if placed in water because of the absence of oxygen. 
Yet, a novel application of the hydrostatic test, where the presence of 
amniotic fluid and red blood cells in lung tissue are tested for, could 
be used to determine whether the foetus had indeed experienced pain 
and whether the foetus had attempted to breath and could therefore 
be said to have been ‘alive’. It was also submitted by the prosecution 
in the Mshumpa case that the medical evidence was conclusive that 
the intentional killing of such a foetus should, based on the foregoing, 
be regarded as murder.
Froneman J for the Eastern Cape High Court Division did not agree 
with such an extended development of the ‘born alive’ principle.32 He 
held that the Constitution does not expressly confer any rights onto an 
unborn child, and that the act of killing such an unborn child would 
not go unpunished as it would certainly be taken into consideration 
at the sentencing stage of criminal proceedings.33 Froneman J 
also highlighted the following practical difficulties in formulating a 
reasonable, precise and extended definition of murder to include the 
killing of an unborn child:
it is uncertain whether the viability of the foetus should be a pre-•	
requisite;
29 S v Mshumpa 2008 (1) SACR 126 (E), para [48].
30 Knuppel op cit (n10) 402-413. 
31 While the fully respired lung is pink or mottled in appearance and spongy in 
texture, the lungs of the stillbirth are dark, small, heavy and liver-like, even though 
they may still float. Knight op cit (n 19) 445-447
32 S v Mshumpa 2008 (1) SACR 126 (E), para [56].
33 S v Mshumpa 2008 (1) SACR 126 (E), para [57]. 
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it is furthermore unclear whether such an extended definition •	
should be restricted to third party killings and exclude the mother; 
and
how such an extended definition would fit in with the criminal •	
offence and sanction for illegal abortion under the Choice on 
Termination of Pregnancy Act 92 of 1996 is also fraught with 
potential problems.34
Froneman J consequently concluded that these practical difficulties 
can be overcome and the killing of an unborn child can effectively 
be redressed within the ambit of the existing crime of assault against 
a pregnant mother. Such an approach, it was held, avoids the formal 
difficulties of formulating a precise definition for an extended crime 
of murder and also does not make the punishment of an injury or 
killing of an unborn child dependent on the stage that the pregnancy 
has reached.35 The question remains, however, whether the medical 
expert evidence in support of the argument that the unborn foetus in 
the Mshumpa case had in fact suffered pain and had for all intents and 
purposes breathed, been given adequate recognition.
5.  Should provision be made for the criminalisation of 
the killing of an unborn foetus in light of the medical 
evidence submitted in the Mshumpa case?
The question whether a person should be held criminally liable for 
causing the death of any living child which has not proceeded in a 
living state from the body of its mother,36 by any act or omission 
which would have amounted to murder if such a child had been fully 
born, is no novel question in legal jurisprudence.37 In this part of 
the discussion a short overview will be provided on the relevant case 
law and legislation on feticide in the United Kingdom as well as the 
different states of the United States of America.
In the 1833 English case Rex v Richard Enoch and Mary Bully38 
Justice Parke held that a child may indeed breathe before it is born, 
but its having breathed is not sufficiently indicative of life to make the 
killing of such a child murder. It was held that independent circulation 
34 S v Mshumpa 2008 (1) SACR 126 (E), para [58] to [59].
35 S v Mshumpa 2008 (1) SACR 126 (E), para [64].
36 In other words feticide. Feticide should be distinguished from infanticide. Feticide 
is the destruction of the life of the foetus, whereas, infanticide is the killing of a 
newborn child. See WF Rhodes, I Gordon & R Turner Medical Jurisprudence 2ed 
(1945) 178 – 189.
37 It must be noted that if the child is intentionally fatally injured before it is born, but 
is born alive, and afterwards dies of that injury, it will be regarded as murder.
38 Rex v Richard Enoch and Mary Bully 3 English Reports 172 (1833).
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is also required before it can be concluded that the child was born 
alive.39 And, in another English case Rex v Sellis40 it was held that 
affirmative proof that the child had breathed was not decisive proof 
that the child was born alive as it may have breathed and yet died 
before birth because the whole body of the child had not been born 
when the lung inflation had occurred.41Constant criticism to the 
independent circulation test, first set out in the 1833 case of Enoch 
and Bully, led to the passage of the Infant Life Preservation Act of 
1929 in the United Kingdom. This Act is still in force today.42 The 
Act is, for all intents and purposes, a feticide statute criminalising 
the intentional destruction of a child that is capable of being born 
alive.43 In terms of this Act, evidence that a woman who had at any 
material time been pregnant for a period of twenty-eight weeks or 
more shall be prima facie proof that she was at that time pregnant of 
a child capable of being born. It is therefore no longer required for 
live birth that an independent circulation be proofed; the viability of 
the foetus and its capability of being born alive is now the only prima 
facie proof necessary. The question of live birth has consequently 
become superfluous in defining culpability for the destruction of a 
viable foetus.44
In a landmark American case Morgan v State45 the Supreme Court 
of Tenessee agreed with the English courts’ findings, that the test for 
being born alive is breathing and this test is not infallible as infants 
sometimes breathe before they are fully delivered and sometimes they 
do not breathe for a perceptible period after they had been delivered. 
However, once respiration is established, independent circulation is also 
established and, that is then indicative of independent existence.46 In 
People v Hayner,47 however, the New York Court of Appeals reminded 
that whatever the true test may be in medical science with regard to 
live birth, in the theory of law it is whether the child is able to carry on 
39 ST Ishmael ‘Proving live birth in infanticide’ (1962-1963) 17 Wyoming Law Journal 
237-243 at 237.
40 Rex v Sellis 173 Eng. Reprint 370 (1837). 
41 Ishmael op cit (n39) 238. 
42 Infant Life Preservation Act of 1929, Statute Book 19 & 20 Geo. 5 Chapter 34. L 
Westerfield ‘The born alive doctrine: A legal anachronism’ (1975-1976) 2(2) Southern 
University Law Review 149-174 R 150-151. JA Meldman ‘Legal concepts of human 
life: the infanticide doctrines’ (1968) 52 Marquette Law Review 105-115.
43 L Westerfield op cit (n42) 150-151.
44 Westerfield op cit (n42) 151.
45 148 Tenn. 417, 256 S.W. 433 (1923); Also see Shedd v State 178 Ga. 653, 173 S.S. 847 
(1934).
46 Independent circulation was also required in State v Winthrop 2843 Iowa 519 (1876). 
Ishmael op cit (n39) 238; Westerfield op cit (n42) 150-151.
47 300 N.Y. 171, 90 N.E.2d 23 (1949). 
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its being without the help of the mother’s circulation. It was also held 
that the expansion of the lungs was of no great moment because the 
legal test of live birth requires a separate circulation made irrelevant 
by the question whether the child had breathed or not.48Although the 
independent circulation test was confirmed in the Hayner decision, the 
court also indicated that live birth could only be proved by a witness 
who either heard or saw the infant cry at the time of the birth.49
Yet, in People v Chavez50the California court came to a different 
conclusion and rejected the majority holdings on the question of live 
birth. It held that there is no reason why an infant should not be 
considered a human being when born or removed from the body of 
its mother and when it has reached the stage of development where it 
is capable of living an independent life as a separate being and where 
in the natural course of events it will so live if given a normal and 
reasonable chance. It was also held that a viable child in the process 
of being born should be regarded as a human being afforded with 
legal subjectivity. ‘While the question of whether death by criminal 
means has resulted while the process of birth was being carried out, 
or shortly thereafter, may present difficult questions of fact, those 
questions should be met and decided on the basis of whether or not 
a living baby with the natural possibility and probability of growth 
and development was being born, rather than on any hard and fast 
technical rule establishing a legal fiction that the infant being born 
was not a human being because some part of the process of birth had 
not been fully completed.’51
This judgement was also followed in Singleton v State52and Keeler v 
Superior Court.53 In the latter case the California Court of Appeal for 
the Third District held that when a foetus had developed to the stage 
of viability, it is a human being for the purpose of California’s homicide 
statutes.54(This decision was later overruled by the California Superior 
Court.)55 Thereafter, numerous tests developed in the different USA 
state courts and after the New York Legislature passed a feticide 
48 Ishmael op cit (n39) 239; Westerfield op cit (n42) 150-151.
49 Westerfield op cit (n42) 150-151. The Hayner judgement was also confirmed in 
State v Osmus 73 Wyo. 183, 276 P.2d 469 (1954). Ishmael op cit (n39) 240; Also 
see Bennett v. State, 377 P.2d 634 (Wyo. 1963) in which the Osmus judgement was 
repudiated to a certain extent. In Bennett much more reliance is placed on medical 
testimony and expert evidence.
50 77 Cal. App. 2d 621, 176 P.2d 92 (1947).
51 Ishmael op cit (n39) 240.
52 33 Ala. 536, 35 So. 2d 375 (1948).
53 80 Cal. Rptr. 865 (Dist. Ct. App. 1969).
54 Ishmael op cit (n39) 240.
55 38 U.S.L.W. 2696 (Cal. Sup. Ct. June 12, 1970).
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statute56 in 1830, other states soon followed with similar legislation.57 
These statutes often used quickening as the general criterion for 
viability. Quickening precedes viability and tends to occur around 
the fourth or fifth month of pregnancy when the mother first starts 
to feel foetal movement. Viability is generally said to occur near the 
sixth or seventh month of pregnancy.58 Today the difference between 
quickening and viability has become almost irrelevant.
In 1967 the New York code59 was amended to provide for twenty-
four weeks as the viability criterion of a foetus and in 1970 murder 
was redefined in the California Penal Code60 to include the killing of 
a foetus.61 By 2010 thirty-four states in the USA had foetal homicide 
laws, nine states had provisions explicitly targeting violence against 
pregnant women and seven states and the District of Columbia 
had neither foetal homicide laws nor any criminal laws specifically 
penalising violence against pregnant women.62 In 2004 USA Congress 
passed federal legislation on feticide, the Unborn Victims of Violence 
Act (UVVA).63 This Act criminalises the death of or bodily injury to an 
unborn child or child in utero64 as a separate offence.65 To obtain a 
conviction under the UVVA it must be established, beyond a reasonable 
doubt that a defendant had criminal intent towards some victim, had 
violated one of the federal laws enumerated in the statute66 and that 
this criminal conduct caused the death of an unborn child. The same 
punishment will be imposed as if the defendant had committed the 
crime against the foetus’s mother.67
56 N.Y. Rev Stat of 1829, pt. IV, ch. 1, tit, 2, § 8;
57 Arkansas Stat. Ann. § 41-2223 (1964); 22 Fla. Stat.Ann. § 782.09 (1965); 2 Kansas 
Stat. Ann. § 21-409 (1964); 25 Michigan Stat. Ann. § 28.554 (1954); 2A Mississippi 
Code Ann. § 2222 (1942); 2 N.D. Century Code § 12-25-03 (1960); Oklahoma Stat. 
Ann. 21, § 713 (1958).
58 Westerfield op cit (n42) 154; J Pedone ‘Filling the Void: Model Legislation for Fetal 
Homicide Crimes’ (2009) 43(1) Columbia Journal of Law and Social Problems 77-116 
at 81. 
59 N.Y. Penal Law § 125.00
60 West’s Ann. Cal. Penal Code (West Supp. 1971),
61 Westerfield op cit (n42) 155, also for a discussion on the legal reforms with regard 
to infanticide in the State of Louisiana. 
62 Pedone op cit (n58) 78.
63 Pub. L. No. 108-212, 118 Stat. 568 (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. § 919(a), 18 
U.S.C. § 1848 (2006)).
64 This, in terms of 18 U.S.C. § 1841(d) (2006), refers to a member of the species 
homosapiens at any stage of development who is carried in the womb.
65 77. 18 U.S.C. § 1841(d) (2006); Pedone op cit (n 58) 93.
66 Including most notably terrorist attacks, threats against a witness in a federal 
proceeding, violence at aninternational airport, drug-related killings, attacks 
involving interstate stalkings, and domestic violence on military bases.
67 Pedone op cit (n58) 93.
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It is evident that many divergent opinions exist on whether an 
unborn but viable foetus (viability being determined by an even more 
divergent range of tests and opinions) should acquire some level of legal 
personhood for the purpose of criminal proceedings. In the UK and in 
most states in the USA this contentious problem has been addressed by 
adopting feticide legislation that criminalises the intentional killing of 
a viable foetus. When exactly a foetus is regarded as viable, however, 
differs from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Froneman J in the Mshumpa 
case also held that it might be necessary for the legislature to create 
a separate statutory crime of feticide.68A more detailed discussion of 
the content and working of such feticide legislation do not fall within 
the ambit of this article since the primary focus of this article is on 
the medico-legal evidence and concerns with regard to the born alive 
doctrine. It must however be made clear that feticide legislation, in 
general, does not interfere with abortion laws. Feticide legislation is 
aimed at remedying a harm that occurs without the consent of the 
woman. The violent actions taken against the woman and her foetus 
are not done by her own choice, for her benefit and do not concern the 
protection of her constitutional right to bodily integrity and privacy. 
Feticide legislation only contemplates a third-party’s violent actions 
against a pregnant woman so that both that woman and her foetus are 
victims in the eyes of the law.69
6. Conclusion
Based on this concise review of case law on the determination of 
live birth and when a foetus is viable, it seems as though we are still 
struggling with the medieval question of mediate animation, or the 
moment when the soul enters the foetus. From a medico-legal point 
of view two major tests have developed for use in proving the live 
birth of a foetus. Some jurisdictions, including South Africa, adopted 
a breathing test which requires that the foetus must have breathed. 
It was evident from the discussion above that this criterion is not 
necessarily indicative of life, and pathologists like Littlejohn argue that 
only complete respiration or respiration involving the greater part of 
both lungs is positive proof of live birth in a legal sense.70 A second 
requirement put forward by the majority of courts in the UK and USA 
requires, in addition to the requirement that the foetus must have 
breathed, that the foetus must also have an independent circulation 
68 S v Mshumpa 2008 (1) SACR 126 (E), paras [49]; [59] and [65]. 
69 Pedone op cit (n58) 78; Also see AK Bruchs ‘Clash of competing interests: Can the 
unborn victims of violence act and over thirty years of settled abortion law co-exist 
peacefully?’ (2004) 55(1) Syracuse Law Review 133 – 159.
70 Littlejohn op cit (n21) 142. 
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in order to be afforded legal subjectivity and be deemed to have been 
born alive.
Medical science has, to date, not developed a medical test to 
determine whether a foetus has independent circulation. Nor, has 
the courts developed a legal meaning for the concept of independent 
circulation.71 Generally it is said that an infant that exists separate from 
its mother will be deemed to have an independent circulation. Medical 
evidence has also shown that as a foetus becomes viable it has its own 
circulatory system and can therefore be said to have an independent 
circulation. Yet, other jurisdictions even pose a third requirement, that 
the umbilical cord is severed. In South Africa it is only required in terms 
of s 239 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 that it be proved that 
the child had breathed. It is not necessary that the umbilical cord be 
severed nor is prove of an independent circulation required. Medically 
speaking it is easier to determine whether a child had breathed (via 
the hydrostatic test) than to determine whether there was independent 
circulation. However, as was evident from the discussion above, this 
requirement – that the foetus had breathed – is also not without its 
potential pitfalls.72
The hydrostatic test, although not perfect, is still one of the most 
effective tests to determine live birth. Care should, however, be taken 
not to rely on the results of this test alone, but rather to come to a 
conclusion only after other tests (such as the liver flotation, macro- and 
microscopic analysis, etc.) have also been considered. The surrounding 
circumstances and all possible influences that may affect the outcome 
of the finding must also be kept in mind. It was furthermore clear 
from the discussion in part 3 of this article that the fact that a foetus 
had breathed is not always indicative of life. It was shown that the first 
breath drawn by a foetus is not necessarily a conclusive sign of life as 
the central and motor pathways of the foetal respiratory system are 
active and respiration may be the result of the central nervous system 
reacting to sudden pressure, temperature change and/or external 
stimuli. It is furthermore not even essential that a foetus should have 
breathed at the time it was killed, as many children are born alive, and 
yet do not breathe for some time afterwards.
While it can therefore rightly be asked why, the killing of a foetus 
should not be regarded as murder if the foetus was indeed viable and 
a possibility if independent life existed, the difficulty in proving with 
reasonable certainty that the foetus was indeed viable and alive from 
a medical point of view, and could therefore be afforded with legal 
71 Westerfield op cit (n42) 150. 
72 In terms of the born alive doctrine an unborn child must be born alive and die 
from prenatal injuries inflicted upon it before it can be the subject of a murder trial. 
Ishmael op cit (n39) 242. Westerfield op cit (n42) 149. 
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subjectivity, is an almost impossible task. It is therefore important 
for the legislature to consider the possibility of criminalising conduct 
which, due to its violent nature, negatively affects the unborn child. 
Such legislation will eradicate the need to determine live birth and/or 
viability and/or breathing in cases like that of Mshumpa and at least 
for the purpose of criminal prosecution where criminal conduct fatally 
injured an unborn child.
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